

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology  
Department of Information Systems,  
Business Statistics and Operations Management

Seminar Announcement

***Voluntary Information Disclosure, Supplier Contracting  
and Capital Market Evaluation***

by

***Professor Biying Shou***  
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***City University of Hong Kong***

**Date: Thursday, 16 December 2010**

**Time: 11:00 – 12:00 pm**

**Venue: Room 4379, ISOM Conference Room (Lift 17/18)**

~~~~~ All interested are welcome ~~~~~

**Abstract:** A retailing firm's demand forecast information is essential to investors who assess firms' interim share prices and to suppliers who decide wholesale prices. Using a three-player game model, we characterize i) the retailer's strategy regarding when to disclose the private demand forecast information and when to withhold it, and ii) the investors' and the supplier's pricing strategies. We show that the optimal structure of voluntary information disclosure policy is of threshold-type, which is dependent on the portion of firm shares sold to interim investors. When the portion is low, the retailer would disclose demand information if it is lower than a threshold; When the portion is high, the retailer would disclose demand information if it is higher than a threshold; When the portion is mediate, there may exist two thresholds and the retailer would withhold demand information if it is outside the threshold interval, and disclose it if it is within the interval.

**Bio:** Biying Shou is an Assistant Professor of Management Sciences at City University of Hong Kong. She received B.E. from Tsinghua University and M.S. and Ph.D. from Northwestern University. She has previously worked at Motorola, General Motors, and 4R Systems. Her main research interests include supply chain management, interface of operations management and marketing, stochastic modeling, and agile workforce.